If monetary policy is to aim also at financial stability, how would it change? To analyze this question, this paper develops a general-form framework. Financial stability objectives are shown to make monetary policy more aggressive: in reaction to negative shocks, cuts are deeper but shorter-lived than otherwise. By keeping cuts brief, monetary policy tightens as soon as bank risk appetite heats up. Within this shorter time span, cuts must then be deeper than otherwise to also achieve standard objectives. Finally, we analyze how robust this result is to the presence of a bank regulatory tool, and provide a parameterized example. JEL Classification Numbers: E52, G01, G21
I. Introduction
Various authors have argued that central banks'prolonged accommodative policies spurred risk taking incentives among the …nancial intermediaries that were at the heart of the recent …nancial crisis.
1 This had led to calls for a monetary policy that explicitly considers bank risk taking and …nancial stability, 2 or as it is known in this literature, to "lean against the wind". The main mechanisms through which the so-called risk taking channel of monetary policy is thought to work are: valuation e¤ects, such as collateral which gains value from expansive policy, encouraging riskier pro…les (Borio and Zhu, 2012) ; a search-for-yield that is driven by institutional factors leading some fund managers to seek higher risk to maintain yields after rates on safer assets decline (Rajan, 2006) ; and cheaper short-term debt, which raises levering incentives, and through interaction with banks'limited liability consequently also asset risk incentives (Agur and Demertzis, 2012; Dell'Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez, 2013) .
Empirically, Delis, Hasan and Mylonidis (2011) use micro-level datasets from the US banking sector to examine the relationship between policy rates and risk taking. They …nd that low interest rates signi…cantly strengthen banks'incentives to take on risky assets, and this is especially true for prolonged rate cuts. Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) use data from the Euro Area Bank Lending Survey to show that lower overnight rates soften lending standards. They also …nd evidence that keeping rates "low for too long" reduces credit standards even further. Similarly, Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marquez-Ibanez (2010) …nd that keeping rates low for an extended period of time signi…cantly raises banks'risk pro…les. They obtain this result from a data set that includes quarterly balance sheet information on listed banks in the EU and the US. In this paper we give an analytical interpretation for the meaning of keeping rates "low for too long", on the basis of the persistence of risk on banks'balance sheets, which relates to the long maturity of their assets. In a general form approach, in which we take the objectives of the monetary authority as given, we show that there are two main e¤ects on optimal policy rates following a shock: the …rst is upon impact, and the second refers to the dynamic path of interest rates.
Faced with a negative shock, the authority that "leans against the wind" would cut interest rates deeper upon impact, than absent of a …nancial objective. However, its dynamic response will be to return to the equilibrium level quicker. Intuitively, the monetary authority cuts extra deep at the bottom of the recession, when banks are in the process of building down -4 -risks. This extra depth of the cut is intended to compensate for its short duration. The reason the cut is short-lived is that as soon as the economy is past its lowest point, the monetary authority wants to raise back rates quickly in order to tame the banks'renewed appetite for risk. If this …nancial stability objective is indeed representative of a welfare gain, then by comparison to it, the interest rate path of a standard-objectives authority is "low for too long". The result is summarized in …gure 1, which represents the response of the monetary authority to a negative economic shock. The dotted line graphs the policy of an authority whose objectives include …nancial stability, while the solid line is that of an authority with standard-objectives. While we derive our result in a general-form model, we also provide a parameterized example of the model to highlight its mechanisms (Appendix D).
In an extension we show that a di¤erent interpretation can be given as well for the relationship between bank risk and the duration of a rate cut: since banks know that unwinding risk takes time, they only adjust their portfolio towards greater risk when they foresee that cuts last long.
We investigate the robustness of our result to the presence of bank regulation, which is assigned to the same authority that also controls monetary policy. We show that in the presence of a perfect regulatory tool, perfect in the sense of being both capable of exactly targeting bank risk as well as of full dynamic adjustment, our monetary policy result vanishes. That is, the regulatory tool targets bank risk whereas the interest rate targets only standard objectives, regardless of the weight that the central bank places on …nancial stability. However, when the regulatory tool is imperfect in terms of precision and dynamic adjustability, as arguably the most common tools such as capital requirements indeed are, the di¤erence between a "leaning against the wind" and standard objectives monetary policy in the sense that we have described re-emerges.
©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution -5 -The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 presents the basic model, and section 4 derives the main result. Section 5 then extends to a regulatory tool. Additional extensions to bank optimization, generalized central bank objectives and a parameterized example can be found in the Appendices B-D. All proofs of the propositions in the text are presented in Appendix A.
II. Literature
Although we take the monetary authority's …nancial stability objective as given, several recent papers model a reason for it to exist. Agur and Demertzis (2012) use a banking model to show how exogenous changes in monetary policy a¤ect bank risk taking, and how an optimizing regulator is not in the position to neutralize this e¤ect. The reason is that monetary policy a¤ects both sides of the regulator's trade-o¤, namely …nancial stability and credit provision, so that a rate change essentially tilts the regulatory possibilities frontier. With a regulator that is unable to neutralize the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, there is justi…cation for a coordinated regulatory-monetary policy decision. Acharya and Naqvi (2012) introduce an agency consideration into the analysis of monetary transmission: bank loan o¢ cers are compensated on the basis of generated loan volume. This causes an asset bubble, which a monetary authority can prevent by "leaning against liquidity". Loisel, Pommeret and Portier (2012) construct a model in which it is optimal for the monetary authority to lean against asset bubbles by a¤ecting entrepreneurs'cost of resources in order to prevent herd behavior.
4
A di¤erent approach is taken within the DSGE macro literature. Rather than providing a qualitative analysis, the models of , Angeloni, Faia and Lo Duca (2013) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) make a quantitative comparison of welfare under di¤erent central bank objectives, showing numerically that …nancial objectives can be valid.
5
Compared to these papers, the persistence of bank risk that we model is what gives rise to our main result. This type of issue would be hard to analyze within the DGSE framework because it induces an asymmetric payo¤ structure that cannot be linearized. But in comparison to these micro-founded models our work obviously lacks the rich endogenous reactions that they can produce.
All of the above literature focuses on how monetary policy a¤ects the buildup of …nancial 4 Other papers that model the transmission from monetary policy to bank risk, but without focusing on an argument for why this would a¤ect monetary policy strategy, are Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006), Dubecq, Mojon and Ragot (2009), Drees, Eckwert and Várdy (2010) , Valencia (2011) , and Dell'Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez (2013).
5 There have been many other papers that build on the framework of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) by incorporating …nancial frictions into DSGE models. These are reviewed in Gertler and Kyotaki (2010) . However, banks are usually a passive friction in this literature, with the exception of the papers cited in the text, and Cociuba, Shukayev and Ueberfeldt (2012) , who numerically analyze monetary transmission on banks'incentives to "search for yield", but do not focus on the optimality of "leaning against the wind". See also Goodhart, Osorio and Tsomocos (2009) sector risks, and in all there is a negative relationship between the interest rate and risk taking. However, there is much reason to also consider how monetary policy is optimally set in the aftermath of a …nancial crisis, when lower rates reduce imminent default risk. This is done by Diamond and Rajan (2012) and Farhi and Tirole (2012) , who proceed to investigate how such ex-post interest rate bailouts a¤ect ex-ante risk taking incentives.
III. Model
We describe the economy by the general aggregate demand function: ( 1) where y t ( ) is the output gap; r 
Variable " t represents a persistent demand shock:
with 2 (0; 1) the persistence parameter, and t an iid shock. The impact on the business cycle is such that:
Finally, t represents the bank risk pro…le, taken by …nancial institutions. Although we do not attempt to model risk explicitly here, the types of concepts that we have in mind for risk are, for example, the share of risky loans in a bank's portfolio, or the extent of …nancial innovation, which may bestow both bene…ts and costs on society (Tufano, 2003; Lerner and Tufano, 2011) . This would suggest that there is an optimal level of risk taking in as far as welfare is concerned. We denote this as w . Any negative deviations from it would imply missing out on welfare enhancing opportunities; any positive deviations would be identi…ed with "excessive risk taking".
The monetary authority combines its two objectives in the inter-temporal function, with discount rate < 1, like in Disyatat (2010) :
s.t.:
Here, ( t w ) is the distance between bank risk and socially optimal risk. The monetary authority places a weight of on preventing the costs arising from excessive risk, captured by the function g ( t w ). And it places a weight of (1 ) on the "standard" objective of minimizing output gap ‡uctuations, represented by the function f (y t ( )). 6 We assume that both f (y t ( )) and g ( t w ) are continuous and twice di¤erentiable functions with f (0) = 0, f 00 (y t ( )) = c 1 > 0, g (0) = 0, and g 00 ( ) = c 2 > 0. This means that losses are minimized when, respectively, the output gap and the deviation of risk taking from the social optimum are zero. Moreover, the strictly positive second derivatives also imply that when the distance away from zero increases, losses rise more than linearly (i.e. a large output gap, or a large di¤erence between realized and socially optimal bank risk taking are damaging to welfare).
Furthermore, the fact that both second derivatives are equal to a (positive) constant means that the functions are symmetric around the minimum. This symmetry property is not necessary for our results in section 4, but it simpli…es the analysis with regulation in section 5. Note that for the output gap these assumptions nest the standard speci…cation of a quadratic loss function.
Finally, assuming a linear form of the central bank objective (in terms of ) is not necessary for our results, but rather used for expositional convenience. In Appendix B we give a general form objective function and the required restrictions on it that are su¢ cient for our purposes.
Within the economy described above we introduce a banking sector that is modelled based on the following three axioms:
Axiom 1 Bank optimal risk taking is larger than the social optimum.
Axiom 2 Risk taking is procyclical.
Axiom 3 Risk is persistent.
Each of these can be obtained from various speci…c functional forms. In particular, the …rst axiom relates to bank moral hazard, which is quite a standard feature of the banking literature in general (Freixas and Rochet, 1997) . The bank does not fully internalize the social costs of its risky loans. Part of the cost of its potential insolvency is borne by society rather than by bank shareholders, through limited liability, bailouts, deposit insurance or lost bank-speci…c relations to its customers. Therefore, the bank takes more risk than is socially optimal. The second axiom relates to the returns on risky projects being positively in ‡uenced by the state of the business cycle. Procyclicality is a well-established feature of banking empirical studies. The literature survey of Drumond (2009) discusses various mechanism through which procyclicality arises. Finally, the third axiom holds whenever risky projects are of relatively long maturity. Maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities has always been a key feature of banking, and gained particular prominence in the buildup to the previous crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010) , as even 30-year mortgages were often …nanced using very short-term instruments. Maturity mismatch implies that building down risk on the asset side is a time consuming process.
We model one bank, whose management is risk neutral. This bank can be seen as representing the banking sector's aggregate balance sheet. The bank chooses a risk pro…le t to maximize its pro…t, P t ( t ; y t ( )). We call the bank's pro…t maximizing risk pro…le, b t , and operationalize the …rst axiom as
The second axiom, on the procyclicality of risk taking, is given by:
Finally, the third axiom is operationalized with the constraint
Here, the bank can only gradually shed risk from its balance sheet. 7 We let 2 (0; 1), but later (Proposition 1) impose an additional restriction on the size of , namely that it be small enough to have some impact, that is, the constraint in (8) should bind in at least one period.
IV. A brief but deep cut
We examine next the e¤ects of a persistent shock on the dynamic path of the interest rate (r f Before answering this question we must …rst make precise what we mean by a "short, deep" cut. Let us de…ne as the pro…le of the monetary authority's policy response, where we assign = 0 to the optimal policy of the monetary authority with = 0. This is the baseline case of an authority that does not lean against the wind. We then de…ne a higher as: De…nition 1: Policy pro…le i has a higher than policy pro…le j if:
and for some t < b t and some t > b t the respective conditions are strictly binding. Here, r f is the steady state interest rate and policy is thus de…ned in deviations from that steady state.
Thus, a higher means a deeper but shorter-lived policy. We can now state this section's main result:
Proposition 1 Following a negative shock ( 1 < 0), and assuming that is su¢ ciently small such that the constraint in (8) is binding in at least one period: a monetary authority that "leans against the wind" ( > 0) chooses a pro…le > 0 for its interest rates. It thus opts for a deeper but shorter response, compared to an authority, which only has standard objectives ( = 0):
Intuitively, banks build up risk when the economy picks up again, while rates are still low. This is the pattern that some argue was observed in the aftermath of the 2001-2003 recession, and contributed to the current crisis (see footnote 1). An authority that "leans against the wind" wants to prevent this type of pattern. By raising rates quickly after an initial cut, the monetary authority mitigates the incentives to buildup risk later. This comes at a cost in terms of the optimal output gap stabilization. The more an authority cares about preventing excessive risk, the more it is willing to bear such costs. Thus, the larger the weight on the …nancial stability objective, the shorter are its rate cuts. Given the short window of time in which rates are lowered, the authority then chooses a relatively deep cut, in order to su¢ ciently stimulate the economy. Overall, this yields …gure 1 in the introduction, where the dotted line represents > 0 and the solid line = 0.
Note that throughout the remainder of the paper we assume that is indeed small enough to make the third axiom of relevance (i.e., constraint (8) binding) in at least one period. When this is not the case it is quite obvious that the "leaning against the wind" e¤ect vanishes: it is the persistence of bank risk that drives the result in Proposition 1.
In Appendix D we present a parametric example of our model for a two period optimization, the minimum required to demonstrate our result. Assuming that the constraint on risk persistence, from (8), binds in the …rst period and is released in the second, we show that a monetary authority that has a …nancial objective in addition to its traditional objective, will indeed cut interest rates by more in the …rst period before it returns to the steady state, in line with our Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Proposition 1 does not extend to an upturn ( 1 > 0). No unambiguous statement can be made about the e¤ect of a higher on the dynamics of monetary policy response to a positive shock.
Intuitively, moving the asset portfolio from shorter to longer maturities is not time consuming. But the converse is: building down risk takes time, as risky loans involve long-term commitments. This is implicit in the formalization of the third axiom (equation (8)), which drives the asymmetry between positive and negative shocks.
V. Regulation
We examine next the interaction with bank regulation: if there are prudential tools that can speci…cally target bank risk, how does this a¤ect the dynamic path of monetary policy? To what extent and -perhaps more precisely in the case of a qualitative model like our own -under what conditions does a …nancial stability concern still induce a deviation from the standard policy rate path?
One challenge we face is that incorporating an explicit regulatory tool, such as risk-weighted capital requirements, requires modelling a bank liability side, which our reduced form approach does not include. Agur and Demertzis (2012) do provide a microfounded banking model in which regulation a¤ects bank liabilities and, through it, also bank asset side optimization. That model has no monetary policy dynamics in it, however, which is the focus here.
In line with our approach of the previous sections, we introduce bank regulation in general form. We assume that there is a tool available that allows for the implementation of a risk cap on banks, . This can be interpreted as a risk-weighted capital requirement, which assuming banks come in with a given amount of capital, places an upper bound on the amount of risk they are allowed to take. As a benchmark case we initially assume that the tool is perfect, in the sense that it can be adjusted to always obtain the desired . Moreover, we …rst assume that the tool is also dynamically adjustable over the cycle, t .
Subsequently, we relax these assumption and investigate the implications of an imperfect correspondence between the regulatory tool and t (the authority faces uncertainty about how bank risk is a¤ected by its policies), as well as the inability to dynamically adjust the tool. The latter is based on the observation that capital requirements are cumbersome to adjust in reality, and tend to remain …xed at internationally (e.g. Basel) negotiated levels over long periods of time.
A. Benchmark
We assume that monetary policy and bank regulation are jointly determined by one central bank, which has two tools, the interest rate r issues of policy coordination between the monetary authority and a prudential regulator, and questions on the optimal institutional arrangement (joint or separate) of the tasks, are of great interest, they lie beyond the scope of this paper. We write the optimization problem as follows:
and where the assumptions embodied in equations (1)- (4), and (6)- (8) apply as before.
Proposition 2 r f t is the same for any . The optimal policy path is now always equal to that of the standard objectives ( = 0) authority in Proposition 1.
The availability of a perfect regulatory tool thus eliminates the need to "lean against the wind". This tool already manages to get bank risk at its optimum, so that monetary policy is freed up to focus purely on its standard objectives.
B. Imperfect regulatory tool
We now consider that the regulatory tool su¤ers from two types of imperfections, namely lack of precision and dynamic in ‡exibility. We assume that the central bank can only set its regulatory policy, such as a capital requirements, once namely at the beginning of time. Moreover, the central bank cannot directly determine the risk cap . Rather it adjusts its tool so as to target a desired risk cap, which we call b , but it knows that the realization of can di¤er from its aim. 8 To capture this we assume that:
where is a symmetric, random shock with zero mean, which implies that E [ ] = b and the central bank hits its targeted risk cap on average.
The reason that we consider both these imperfections simultaneously is that solving the problem with an imprecise tool is very complicated if that tool is dynamically adjustable, because the problem then interacts with the dynamic constraint in equation (8) in intricate ways. Conversely, having only dynamic in ‡exibility but with a precise tool would currently be meaningless, since, as seen in Proposition 2, the optimal solution of the central bank would be to just set a constant = w . Thus, we consider this combination of limitations on the regulatory tool for the time being. However, in section 5C we extend to a dynamic w t , in which case we can focus on only the limitation of a dynamically in ‡exible tool, without the need to simultaneously invoke imprecision.
The optimization problem of the central bank now becomes:
Proposition 3 The optimal policy of the central bank is to set b > w , and therefore to allow bank risk to exceed the social optimum on average. Its interest rate policy is then qualitatively the same as in Proposition 1: the > 0 authority chooses a pro…le with deeper and shorter-lived response ( > 0).
The intuition for this result is that imprecision of the regulatory tool is less costly, in expected terms, when it is set above the socially optimal risk level, w , than when it is set below it. This is due to the fact that when the risk cap materializes well above w this has only limited costs, since banks will not choose to take more risk than a certain level ( b t ), and instead if the risk constraint is much below w the central bank experiences the full loss. This asymmetry derives from the inequality in the …rst axiom (equation (6)) where banks' optimal risk taking is always greater than the social optimum.
Due to the fact that the central bank now relaxes regulatory constraints and expects banks to take on excessive risk, the same qualitative arguments apply as in section 4, and the optimal policy rate path will be shorter and deeper when the central bank considers …nancial stability objectives than when it cares only for its standard objectives. This, of course, says nothing of the quantitative change. We argue -but do not prove -that the v-shape dampens in comparison to section 4: for > 0 the availability of regulatory policy relieves monetary policy from some, though not all, of its …nancial stability burden.
C. Dynamic socially optimal risk
So far we have assumed that the socially optimal level of risk taking, w , is constant. This assumption is actually more restrictive than is necessary for Proposition 1, which would carry through as long as (proof available upon request):
That is, what is required is that excessive risk taking is procyclical, in the sense that the gap between the risk that banks want to take, and the risk that society would like them to take, expands during booms. We replace equation (7) with (12). We do this with a speci…c purpose in mind, namely to be able to analyze the impact of a regulatory tool that displays only one imperfection: dynamic in ‡exibility. Thus, like in the benchmark case, the regulator is able to directly determine the risk cap, . However, as in section 5B that risk cap is set at the beginning of time only and cannot be adjusted over the cycle. As we show, this one limitation of the regulatory tool is enough to (qualitatively) retain the v-shape result of Proposition 1. The optimization problem of the central bank now is:
Proposition 4 The central banks sets > min t w t . Hence, there are periods when banks take excessive risk, and in those periods the arguments of Proposition 1 apply.
As socially optimal risk taking itself is now time-variant, the central bank must take care not to be overly restrictive on its regulatory policy, which it can set only at the beginning of time. But by allowing bank risk to be larger than socially optimal in some periods, there is still scope for monetary policy to play a role in improving …nancial stability. Simply put, the reason for monetary policy to "lean against the wind" here is the fact that it can be adjusted more frequently than regulation. And the way in which monetary policy does so, is in the manner described before, even if, as discussed earlier, the di¤erence between the policy paths of a standard-objectives and a …nancial-stability oriented authority should be quantitatively smaller compared to a world without bank regulation.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we examine how monetary policy would be altered if it were to account for …nancial imbalances. We allow for the economy to a¤ect risk in a procyclical way, taking into account the persistent nature of long term loans on banks' balance sheets, and then examine how the interaction between bank risk taking and monetary policy would a¤ect the path of interest rates. We …nd that, when faced with negative shocks, monetary authorities that have a …nancial stability objective are better o¤ keeping rate cuts brief. But wishing to close the output gap as well then implies that the cut needs to be bigger than otherwise. The monetary authority essentially "frontloads" the cut to occur at the trough of a recession, when banks are building down risk, so that by the time banks want to start building up risk again, rates increase quickly. In an extension we show that there is also di¤erent way to look at this, namely that when banks foresee a long period of low rates they are keener to pursue a risky strategy, than when cuts are brief. We acknowledge that while accounting for …nancial imbalances has a very clear implication for the path of interest rates, the de…nition and measurement of risk remains a considerable challenge in its implementation. in monetary policy. If …nancial stability targets do become a part of monetary authorities' task, this may necessitate a more ‡uid, and perhaps more aggressive conduct of monetary policy in the future.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We outline our proof in …gure 2 where we plot, on the left and right panes respectively, the interest rates and the associated levels of risk taking for di¤erent . In the right pane the dashed (red) line represents how the constraint on risk ( t t 1 ) prevents the reduction of risk from one period to the next. In other words, up to point t even though the interest rate drop is di¤erent for the two policies (as shown in the left pane), the risk reduction is identical and captured by this line. After that point, the two policies di¤er with the risk being higher (quicker to return to the initial state) for the policy for which = 0. To demonstrate this, consider …rst = 0, i.e. no dynamic constraint on risk taking. First, by
= (+) (+) > 0 a negative shock, 1 < 0, implies that b t decreases and then, as " t ! 0, gradually returns to b , the bank's steady state optimal risk taking. This is true for any policy irrespective of . Then, for > 0, the constraint t t 1 will be binding from t = 0 up to a t , at which point
For a su¢ cient proof set b t = t . We observe that for t < t policy cuts r f t r f are less deep for = 0, generating risk taking that is closer to society's optimal. For t > t , policy cuts r f t r f implied by > 0 however, generate risk taking that is closer to society's optimal. Then up to t the constrained paths of = 0 and > 0 are equivalent. But, subsequently, > 0 has lower risk taking. In terms of …nancial stability, the > 0 thus o¤ers an unambiguous gain on the …nancial stability objective, i.e.:
However, it is also an unambiguous loss on P T t=0 t [f (y t ( ))] by the de…nition that = 0 is the path of the = 0 authority, which minimizes f (y t ( )). It follows that the more weight the authority puts on preventing …nancial imbalances (higher ), the more it is willing to give up on minimizing f (y t ( )) to achieve a lower g ( t w ), which implies that 
where H is a set of functions such that when f (y t ( )) > g ( t ; w ) the value of H (f (y t ( )) ; g ( t ; w )) decreases in , and when f (y t ( )) < g ( t ; w ) the value of H (f (y t ( )) ; g ( t ; w )) increases in .
Moreover, g ( t ;
w ) satis…es And, furthermore, the same properties as before for f (y t ( )) and g ( t ; w ) apply, namely: they are continuous and twice di¤erentiable functions with f (0) = 0, f 00 (y t ( )) = c 1 > 0, g (0) = 0, and g 00 ( ) = c 2 > 0.
It is possible to choose b > 0 such that the trade-o¤ is unambiguously dominated by the latter argument. We reiterate that this says nothing of the optimality of such paths from the perspective of monetary policy, since we are not deriving the optimal response here.
A proof of existence thus su¢ ces. Take a b such that at t = 1, r
and subsequently r f t = b = r f t from t = 2 onwards. One can take arbitrarily small such that instantaneous (period 1) gain in P i1 ( ) from a higher it is o¤set by the losses in P i1 ( ) for t 2 (2; t 0 ) (even just at t = 2 su¢ ces). Hence b > 0 can be de…ned such that it j = b < it j =0 8t.
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In equilibrium there are no shocks and therefore the steady-state interest rate is 
so that compared to the steady state rate, the initial rate cut is deeper for the > 0 authority than for the = 0 authority.
We can also depict this graphically. Let us say, for visual simplicity, that " 3 = 0 (the shock lasts only two periods -then return to steady state). And let us take " 1 = 1, = 0:5, = 0:5, = 0:5, = 0:5, = 0:25 (this is just an illustrative example which can be generalized for any parameterization through (28)). The two interest rate paths are now: Thus, in this parametric example optimal interest rates behave as described in our generalform model: the authority that cares about bank risk will implement a deeper cut and then raise rates back quickly.
